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1 
INTRODUCTION: THE RISE OF FINTECH 
 
Andrew F. Tuch*
 
  
The use of technology has long accompanied the provision of financial 
products and services. In the late 1950s, financial institutions turned to 
information technology to help settle and record transactions, a burden that 
had grown with the surging volume of securities trades.1 The tool of choice 
was the mainframe computer, then the state of the art in technology.2 In the 
succeeding decades, firms automated processes they had previously 
conducted manually.3 They used information technology to gather, process, 
and report data. They combined information technology with advances in 
financial economic theory, including portfolio theory and the valuation of 
financial derivatives, applying mathematical modeling to construct 
portfolios, refine existing financial instruments, and create new 
instruments.4 Advances in technology lowered barriers to entry and 
generated significant economies of scale.5 With the aid of these advances, 
financial institutions consolidated and finance disintermediated.6 
These changes have only accelerated in recent years. On one account, 
“[i]n the decade and a half of the twenty-first century, we went through a 
major technological inflection point,” a consequence of the exponential 
growth in computation power and data storage capacity and other 
innovations.7 These changes are potentially transforming the provision of 
 
 
* Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis. 
1. See ALAN D. MORRISON & WILLIAM J. WILHELM, JR., INVESTMENT BANKING: 
INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS, AND LAW 230-31 (2007). 
2. Alan D. Morrison & William J. Wilhelm, Jr., Trust, Reputation, and Law: The Evolution of 
Commitment in Investment Banking, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 363, 391-92 (2015). 
3. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 571-72 (3d ed., 2003). 
4. Morrison & Wilhelm, supra note 2, at 382-91. 
5. Id. at 394. 
6. As to these changes, see MICHAEL S. BARR, HOWELL E. JACKSON & MARGARET E. TAHYAR, 
FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 17-18, 207-13 (2nd ed. 2018) 
7. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THANK YOU FOR BEING LATE: AN OPTIMIST’S GUIDE TO THRIVING 
IN THE AGE OF ACCELERATIONS 382 (2015); see also ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE 
SECOND MACHINE AGE: WORK, PROGRESS, AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES 
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financial products and services, altering the institutional landscape, and 
increasing access to finance.8 Tech startups in finance are proliferating, 
attracting talent and capital and making inroads into the business of 
established firms.9 Technology giants—the likes of Amazon, Apple, 
Facebook, and Google—are entering financial services, beginning to offer 
credit cards and currencies as they attempt to push more fully into retail 
banking.10 Meanwhile, incumbents are shifting focus, becoming technology 
innovators. New financial instruments, among them digital tokens and 
cryptocurrencies, are emerging. Data analysis and machine learning have 
growing impact on finance. Fintech may well reshape the financial services 
industry just as technology is disrupting other industries.11  
Yet, for all its novelty, fintech raises familiar regulatory challenges.12 
Commentators are examining the benefits and potential downsides of 
fintech, with particular concern for conduct of business, financial stability, 
and systemic risk.13 They are studying how new instruments and structures 
 
 
34 (2014) (“[W]e’re at an inflection point—a bend in the curve where many technologies that used to 
be found only in science fiction are becoming everyday reality.”). 
8. Some refer to the current era as the “Bitcoin Era.” See William Magnuson, Financial 
Regulation in the Bitcoin Era, 23 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 159. For characteristics of this era, 
differentiating it from earlier periods in which technological advances occurred in finance, see id. at 
163-74 and Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, FinTech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO. L.J. 235 
(2019). 
9. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC 
OPPORTUNITY: NONBANK FINANCIALS, FINTECH, AND INNOVATION 5 (2018) (“From 2010 to the third 
quarter of 2017, more than 3,330 new technology-based firms serving the financial services industry 
have been founded, 40% of which are focused on banking and capital markets. In the aggregate, the 
financing of such firms has been growing rapidly, reaching $22 billion globally in 2017.”). 
10.  See, e.g., Peter Rudegeair & Liz Hoffman, Next in Google’s Quest for Consumer Dominance: 
Banking, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/next-in-googles-quest-for-
consumer-dominancebanking-11573644601. 
11. Thomas Friedman argues that technological advances are reshaping virtually all industries. 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 133 (2015) (“[A]ll industries are becoming computable. When an industry 
becomes computable, it goes through a series of predictable changes: It moves from being digitized to 
being disrupted to being democratized”) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also BRYNJOLFSSON & 
MCAFEE, supra note 7, at 57-70 (examining accelerations in technology in a range of industries). 
12. See BARR, JACKSON & TAHYAR, supra note 6, at 184-88 (discussing regulatory issues arising 
from the use of fintech in retail banking). 
13. As to conduct of business concerns, see, for example, Christopher K. Odinet, Consumer 
Bitcredit and Fintech Lending, 69 ALA. L. REV. 781 (2018), and Rory Van Loo, Technology Regulation 
by Default: Platforms, Privacy, and the CFPB, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 531 (2018). As to financial stability 
and systemic risk concerns, see, for example, William Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, 71 VAND. L. REV. 
1167 (2018), and Saule T. Omarova, New Tech v. New Deal: FinTech as a Systematic Phenomenon, 36 
YALE J. ON REG. 735 (2019).  
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fit within existing regulatory regimes and, when they do not, whether and 
how to regulate them.14 Regulators are working to stay ahead of market 
developments and to calibrate their responses in the absence of reliable or 
complete information about how exactly new technologies are affecting 
markets—and about how market participants will respond to rule changes.15 
In the United States, the financial-regulatory architecture tasked with 
corralling fintech remains fragmented across numerous agencies, many of 
them weakly coordinated and beset by overlapping and disputed 
jurisdictions. These agencies oversee both financial entities and functions 
in ways that suggest an almost accidental design.  
This volume of the Washington University Journal of Law and Policy 
examines fintech, focusing on the regulatory and other challenges it poses. 
The symposium benefits from contributions by prominent scholars of 
financial and securities regulation. These contributions examine the 
structure of firms and markets, considering fintech activities occurring 
within existing firms and regulatory perimeters and activities that spill over 
the boundaries we currently take for granted. The contributors examine the 
emerging regulatory responses to fintech, taxonomizing them. They 
consider which regulatory approaches, or ecosystems, will best help fintech 
to develop. They examine how fintech applies to fundraising, examining 
initial coin offerings (ICOs) and equity crowdfunding, techniques that 
attract attention for different reasons—ICOs because they occur so 
frequently beyond existing regulatory perimeters when they should not and 
equity crowdfunding because it occurs so infrequently despite enjoying 
regulatory accommodations. Our authors also examine the promise and 
limits of “smart” contracts in consumer finance. They explore “stable 
cryptocurrencies.” They look to Kenya for a case study of fintech lending 
in fledgling credit markets. A snapshot of these articles follows.  
 
 
14. See, e.g., Hilary J. Allen, $=€=Bitcoin?, 76 MD. L. REV. 877, 920-40 (2017) (examining the 
regulatory status of virtual currencies); Henry T.C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, “Pure 
Information,” and the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601 (2012) (examining how 
financial innovation creates complexity that existing disclosure approaches struggle to accurately and 
completely depict); Jonathan Rohr & Aaron Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin 
Offerings, and the Democratization of Public Capital Markets, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 463, 485-510 (2019) 
(examining the regulation of initial coin offerings under federal securities laws). 
15. For a recent study considering many of the issues facing regulators, see U.S. DEP’T OF 
TREASURY, supra note 9. For an insightful discussion of challenges facing regulators in an era of 
technological innovation, see Tom Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 717-22 (2013). 
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In “The Nature of the Fintech Firm,” Professor Howell Jackson examines 
why some fintech activities are located within the firm under corporate 
managerial control (and often subject to strict regulation), while others 
occur by means of arm’s length transactions in the marketplace (often 
beyond direct regulatory oversight).16 The revolution in fintech “increases 
the set of viable arrangements for producing financial services, potentially 
relocating significant amounts of activities that were previously based 
within the regulated firm and subject to management discretion in a well-
supervised environment.”17 Innovations have thus challenged regulatory 
regimes. They may nevertheless serve the public interest, by, for example, 
providing to the unbanked services that regulated firms have found 
unprofitable. Innovations also pose challenges for applying conventional 
legal doctrines that turn on a legal actor’s state of mind. These doctrines are 
poorly suited to conduct produced by computer code and artificial 
intelligence. 
Focusing on regulatory developments, Professor Saule T. Omarova 
identifies three primary emerging regulatory strategies for fintech in 
“Dealing with Disruption: Emerging Approaches to Fintech Regulation.”18  
She labels these strategies “experimentation,” “incorporation,” and 
“accommodation.” Most consequential among the risks fintech creates are 
macro-level, systemic risks, namely that fintech may disrupt what Professor 
Omarova calls the “New Deal settlement in finance,” the balance between 
“private freedom and public control in the financial market.”19 
Experimentation is typified by the “regulatory sandbox,” which allows a 
“safe space” for regulators to test novel financial products and services, and 
therefore experiment with regulatory measures. Incorporation is typified by 
the provision of licenses or charters for fintech firms, an effort to bring these 
firms within existing regulatory and supervisory regimes. Accommodation 
is typified by RegTech, the use of technology by regulators and supervisors 
to adjust to or accommodate fintech developments. Professor Omarova 
identifies and assesses the elements of these regulatory strategies, 
 
 
16. Howell E. Jackson, The Nature of the Fintech Firm, 61 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 9 (2020) 
17. Id. at 11. 
18. Saule T. Omarova, Dealing with Disruption: Emerging Approaches to Fintech Regulation, 
61 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 25 (2020) 
19. See Omarova, supra note 13, at 746-47. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/7
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“establish[ing] a helpful baseline for further discussion and policy 
analysis.”20 
Also focusing on regulatory developments in fintech, professors Ross 
Buckley, Douglas Arner, Robin Veidt, and Dirk Zetsche examine how 
regulators may support the development of fintech in the article “Building 
Fintech Ecosystems: Regulatory Sandboxes, Innovation Hubs, and 
Beyond.”21 Although regulatory sandboxes have proven popular with 
regulators, innovation hubs are likely to be more effective in fostering 
innovation, Professor Buckley and colleagues argue. These are “portals” by 
which fintech industry participants can access regulators “to discuss their 
proposed fintech innovation, gain some guidance. . . , and potentially seek 
dispensations or adjustments.”22 Professor Buckley and his coauthors 
examine the core features of sandboxes and their primary potential benefits 
and risks, offering advice on how regulators can “gain the greatest benefits 
to ecosystem development.”23 
Contributions by Professor James J. Park and Mr. Howard H. Park and 
by Professor Usha R. Rodrigues examine ICOs, offerings to fund virtual 
currency and blockchain-related startups. These articles also consider 
regulators’ efforts to bring these offerings within existing regulatory 
perimeters. An elaborate regulatory regime governs raising funds from the 
public, requiring public offerings of securities to be made under a 
registration statement filed with and declared effective by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). Issuers and others are subject to a 
comprehensive liability regime for deceptive statements. Whether ICOs are 
subject to the regime turns fundamentally on whether digital tokens are 
investment contracts and therefore securities under the Securities Act of 
1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934.24 Since 2017 the SEC has 
forcefully asserted its jurisdiction.  
Professor Park and Mr. Park focus on the SEC’s enforcement record 
involving ICOs in “Regulation by Selective Enforcement: The SEC and 
 
 
20. Omarova, supra note 18, at 53. 
21. Ross P. Buckley, Douglas Arner, Robin Veidt & Dirk Zetsche, Building Fintech Ecosystems: 
Regulatory Sandboxes, Innovation Hubs and Beyond, 61 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55 (2020) 
22. Id. at 58. 
23. Id. at 84. 
24. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF 
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: THE DAO (2017).    
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Initial Coin Offerings.”25 They note scholarly criticism of the SEC’s 
decision to regulate through enforcement actions rather than by 
propounding and applying clear rules.26 But they argue that the SEC “had 
little choice” other than to take the approach it has: bringing only a 
“handful” of “carefully chosen” and highly visible enforcement actions.27 
Professor Park and Mr. Park argue that the SEC has provided guidance to 
market participants and reduced the incidence of unregistered ICOs. But 
while the SEC’s approach “has largely been successful,” it has created 
potential dangers, which the authors examine.28 Perhaps inevitably, the 
status of ICO tokens is still the subject of open questions, and thus the limits 
of the SEC’s jurisdiction are also unclear. 
Professor Rodrigues observes that many issuers seek to avoid, or even 
ignore, having their ICOs regulated as public offerings of securities and 
argues that they should change course and comply with the regime. Her 
article, “Embrace the SEC,” contends not that the SEC’s interpretation of 
ICOs’ status as subject to SEC regulation is correct (although she does not 
dispute it), but that it is in issuers’ interests to comply since the benefits of 
doing so exceed the costs.29 Professor Rodrigues “seeks to persuade the 
blockchain community that what it really needs to offer the general public 
is a security.”30 Investors find registered offerings attractive, since they 
carry both the imprimatur of the SEC and important investor protections. 
Registration also empowers entrepreneurs. But Professor Rodrigues 
cautions that the SEC must be flexible, seeking to make ICOs more viable. 
She also explores an innovation designed to better protect investors, namely, 
the use of escrow agents to protect investors’ funds.31 
The symposium volume examines the extent to which equity 
crowdfunding is realizing its promise. In “Crowdfunding Issuers in the 
 
 
25. James J. Park & Howard H. Park, Regulation by Selective Enforcement: The SEC and Initial 
Coin Offerings, 61 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99 (2020). 
26. For a discussion of the critique, see James J. Park, The Competing Paradigms of Securities 
Regulation, 57 DUKE L.J. 625, 635-38 (2007). 
27. Park & Park, supra note 25, at 101. 
28. Id. at 126. 
29. Usha R. Rodrigues, Embrace the SEC, 61 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y  133 (2020). 
30. Id. at 136.  
31. See also Usha Rodrigues, Semi-Public Offerings? Pushing the Boundaries of Securities Law 
18-35 (Univ. of Ga. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2018-30, 2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3242205 (examining various other safeguards to address fraud in ICOs).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/7
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United States,” Professor Andrew A. Schwartz builds on his considerable 
work in the field by providing an empirical report32 on the use of 
crowdfunding in the United States from 2016 to 2018, the three-year period 
since crowdfunding formally commenced under the SEC’s Regulation 
Crowdfunding.33 Professor Schwartz’s report complements and extends a 
recent review by the SEC Staff.34 Among other findings, Professor Schwartz 
reveals that crowdfunding tended to be used by early startups that were 
structured as corporations or limited liability companies, employed ten or 
fewer employees, and generated zero or negative revenue. His evidence 
suggests that crowdfunding has provided greater access to capital than 
traditional alternatives, primarily venture capital. During the study period, 
issuers came from forty-four states, not just from the typical startup hotbeds. 
And twenty-eight percent of a large sample of firms had signatories with 
traditionally female names, suggesting that a larger-than-usual proportion 
of firms were founded or led by women. 
In “Smart Contracts and the Illusion Automated Enforcement,” Professor 
Danielle D’Onfro focuses on the limits of “smart” contracts in consumer 
finance, rejecting the notion that these “self-executing and self-enforcing 
agreements” will make “perfectly automated enforcement” possible.35 
Professor D’Onfro identifies three barriers to the use of smart contracts in 
consumer finance. First, “no one,” neither consumers nor financial firms, 
wants perfect enforcement of contracts, instead wanting flexibility in 
enforcement.36 Second, consumer protection laws may be incompatible with 
smart contracts. Third, market participants, particularly those that cannot 
take advantage of smart contracts, will oppose their use. These barriers 
“render perfectly automated enforcement all but impossible.”37 Professor 
D’Onfro can imagine smart contracts that are “modifiable ex-post” but 
 
 
32. Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Issuers in the United States, 61 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
155 (2020). 
33. See Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388 (Nov.16, 2015) (to be codified at various parts of 
17 C.F.R.). 
34. STAFF OF THE SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT TO THE COMMISSION: REGULATION 
CROWDFUNDING (2019), https://www.sec.gov/files/regulation-crowdfunding-2019_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3RLH-REQY]. 
35. Danielle D’Onfro, Smart Contracts and the Illusion of Automated Enforcement, 61 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 173 (2020) 
36. Id. at 181-82. 
37. Id. at 175. 
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suggests we cannot know yet whether these contracts will be more efficient 
than traditional contracts. 
 In “Stable Cryptocurrencies,” Professors Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, 
and Vadhindran Rao examine cryptocurrencies that tend to be stable in 
value and therefore to operate as a “safe haven” for investors during periods 
of currency instability.38 They consider the limitations of fiat currencies. 
Stable cryptocurrencies have grown in popularity, offering important 
benefits to users. In a wide-ranging analysis, the authors describe many of 
these benefits and some that may be realized in years ahead. The authors 
suggest that in some markets cryptocurrencies may supplement or even 
replace fiat currencies, although “open questions need to be answered as the 
technology and associated stability designs evolve.”39  
Finally, Dr. Jonathan Greenacre provides a case study of the spread of 
fintech lending in Kenya since 2012. His article “What Regulatory 
Problems Arise When FinTech Lending Expands into Fledgling Credit 
Markets?”40 examines the benefits and costs of fintech lending in Kenya and 
similar markets, but offers important lessons for U.S. regulators as well. Dr. 
Greenacre notes the promise of fintech, including increased financial 
inclusion, but observes significant downsides, including inaccurate risk-
pricing and high default rates, particularly among first-time borrowers. 
Financial regulation, which tends to regulate entities rather than functions, 
has struggled to effectively regulate fintech lending in Kenya and requires 
reform. 
Scholarship in fintech is burgeoning as fintech itself develops and 
regulators grapple with the associated challenges. These contributions to the 
Washington University Journal of Law and Policy will help chart the course 
for future research in the field.
 
 
38. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal & Vadhindran Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies, 61 WASH U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 193 (2020). 
39. Id. at 226. 
40. Jonathan Greenacre, What Regulatory Problems Arise When Fintech Lending Expands into 
Fledgling Credit Markets?, 61 WASH U. J.L. & POL’Y 229 (2020). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/7
